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PEOPLE .WILLIAMS. EXPANSION OF THE
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF VOIR DIRE IN THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Voir dire is the face to face courtroom examination of prospective
jurors for the purpose of ascertaining their ability and competency to
decide a particular controversy.' The vital role performed by voir dire
in the process of impaneling a fair and impartial jury is reflected in the
attitude of many experienced litigators that cases are won or lost on the
basis of this examination.
2
In theory, voir dire functions as a method by which counsel and
the court may elicit sufficient information from prospective jurors to
ensure that the jury is composed of qualified individuals who are com-
petent to determine the factual issues presented without bias, prejudice,
or partiality. Ultimately, voir dire functions to explore the "subtle nu-
ances of conscience" 3 to determine as precisely as possible a prospec-
tive juror's state of mind regarding the case and the parties. Thus, the
formal purpose of voir dire is to develop a basis for a challenge for
cause .
4
In practice, the information gleaned from voir dire examination
serves not only to illuminate any actual or conscious biases which a
prospective juror may harbor, but also functions either to reinforce or
1. Voir dire literally means "to speak the truth." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (5th
ed. 1979). In practice, voir dire has come to denote the pretrial procedure in which prospec-
tive jurors are questioned by counsel in the presence of the court. Id
2. See Title, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Criminal Cases, 43 STATE B. J. 70, 71
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Title]. But see Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect ofPeremptory Chal-
lenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491,
528-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zeisel & Diamond]. Although Zeisel and Diamond con-
cede that there are some cases in which the outcome is seriously affected, if not determined,
by the voir dire examination, id at 518-19, overall, the experiments that they conducted in
twelve criminal trials in federal district court suggested that voir dire did not function effec-
tively to provide attorneys with sufficient information to detect the presence of prejudiced
jurors. Id at 528-29; see also Broeder, Voir Dire Examination: An Empirical Study, 38 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 503 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Broeder]. After conducting a study involving
twenty-three consecutively tried federal district court jury trials, Broeder concluded that voir
dire was "grossly ineffective as a screening mechanism. . .[and was] utilized much more
effectively as a forum for indoctrination than as a means of sifting out potentially unfavora-
ble jurors." Id at 528.
3. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 312 (4th Cir. 1968).
4. United States v. Bount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973); see Title, supra note 2, at
71.
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dispel counsel's intuitive judgments regarding any suspected hidden
prejudices that the veniremen may have, whether favorable or unfavor-
able to the parties. The extent to which counsel is entitled to use voir
dire examination to elicit information from prospective jurors so/ely for
the purpose of detecting these subtle or hidden biases, and thus to form
a basis for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges,6 was the
issue recently presented to the California Supreme Court in People v.
Williams.7 In Williams, the court held that counsel must be afforded
the opportunity during voir dire to make reasonable inquiries of pro-
spective jurors to assist in the effective use of their peremptory
challenges.8
In adopting the new standard, the Williams court overturned a
longstanding rule, established in 1912 in People v. Edwards,9 that pre-
vented counsel from using voir dire examination for the express pur-
pose of developing insights for the exercise of peremptory challenges. 0
An examination of the history of the Edwards rule, however, reveals
that despite the California Supreme Court's periodic reaffirmation of
Edwards," the lower courts have frequently ignored its prohibitions
and permitted counsel to conduct voir dire examination that violated
not only the letter, but the spirit, of the Edwards rule.12
This note will explore the role played by the peremptory challenge
in securing a fair and impartial jury. It will trace the mercurial history
of the peremptory challenge in California and the divergent judicial
attitudes concerning the permissible scope of voir dire examination
conducted solely with a view to the exercise of a peremptory challenge.
5. Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1964).
6. A peremptory challenge is a right which may be exercised by either party. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970). It is defined as "an objection to a juror for which no
reason need be given, but upon which the Court must exclude him." Id, see infra notes 16-
26 and accompanying text.
7. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal.. Rptr. 317 (1981).
8. Id at 398, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
9. 163 Cal. 752, 127 P. 58 (1912).
10. Id at 755-56, 127 P. at 59.
11. "It is now well settled in this state that a juror may not be examined on voir dire
solely for the purpose of laying a foundation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge."
People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 598, 265 P. 230, 235 (1928); see also People v. Rigney, 55 Cal.
2d 236, 244, 359 P.2d 23, 27, 10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629 (1961); People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81, 87,
273 P. 575, 576 (1928).
12. 1959 Institutefor California Judges - Pane Dicussion, Part II" Selecting the Jury, 47
CALiF. L. REV. 872, 873 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Selecting the Jury]. As part of his partic-
ipation in a panel discussion on the process of selecting the jury, Joseph Ball, former Presi-
dent of the State Bar of California, openly acknowledged thai courts throughout California
have customarily ignored the Edwards rule; see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
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This note concludes that Williams will not achieve the supreme court's
objective of imposing a uniform practice among trial courts with re-
spect to the permissible scope of such voir dire examination, but will in
practice perpetuate the problem of inconsistency.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. 13 The text of
the amendment, however, offers no insight into how the process of se-
lecting a jury with the requisite degree of impartiality is to be accom-
plished. 14 Instead, the courts-and later the legislatures- developed
procedural safeguards to protect this constitutional right in the form of
two types of challenges to prospective jurors: challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges.'
5
A. Challenges for Cause
Challenges for cause allow the court to eliminate from the venire
those jurors who are unable to fulfill the sixth amendment's mandate of
impartiality because of either actual prejudice or prejudice implied
from the juror's relationship to the case or the parties. 6 Challenges for
13. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial... by an impartialjury... "U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment's right
of jury trial was not held applicable to the states until Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). Even before Duncan was decided, however, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required that where states granted the accused the right to a jury trial, this
included the right to be tried by an impartial jury. "In essence, the right to jury trial guaran-
tees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The
failure to accord the accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due pro-
cess.' Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
14. Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1964).
15. Id "The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself,
and has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury." Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1886). In Hayes, the Court
recognized that the number of peremptory challenges permitted is within the sound discre-
tion of the state legislature, the "power of the legislature . . . to prescribe the number of
peremptory challenges . . .[being] limited only by the necessity of having an impartial
jury." Id at 71; see also Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("[T]rial by an
impartial jury is all that is secured [by the Constitution]. The number of challenges is left to
be regulated by the common law or by enactments of Congress."). See generally Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-19 (1965).
16. See generally Title, supra note 2, at 71-74. For all practical purposes, the rules gov-
erning voir dire in civil and criminal cases in California are identical; civil cases frequently
cite criminal cases as precedent when resolving issues concerning voir dire examinations.
See, e.g., Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 882, 64 Cal. Rptr.
655, 658 (1967). The only significant difference between the nature of voir dire in civil and
criminal trials is the number of peremptory challenges granted the litigants. Compare CAL.
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cause for actual bias will be sustained by the court when a prospective
juror is determined to harbor an attitude or state of mind with respect
to the case or the litigants that would prevent that juror from acting
with the requisite impartiality.'7 Because the court must rely primarily
on the prospective juror's own evaluation regarding his or her state of
mind18 in assessing the existence of actual bias, challenges for cause for
actual bias must "necessarily rest on less precise and [less] objective
criteria."' 9
Conversely, challenges for cause for implied bias are usually based
on specifically enumerated statutory grounds.20 For those prospective
jurors who fall into one of these defined categories, "the law conclu-
CIv. PROC. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1981) (each litigant in a civil action involving only two
parties is granted six peremptory challenges) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070 (West Supp.
1981) (both defendant and state are granted twenty-six peremptory challenges when offense
charged is punishable with death or life imprisonment; in all other criminal trials defendant
and state each receive ten peremptory challenges, except where offense charged is punish-
able with a maximum term of imprisonment of 90 days or less, in which case defendant and
state are each entitled to six peremptory challenges). See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 601-602 (West Supp. 1981); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1070-1070.5 (West Supp. 1981); CAL.
Sup. CT. R. 228 (following the text of CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West Supp. 1981) for
application in both civil and criminal trials).
17. In California, a venireman will be excused for cause for actual bias if it is shown that
there exists "a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to either of
the parties, which will prevent him from acting with entire impartiality and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of either party." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1970).
18. In California:
[N]o person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or ex-
pressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded
upon public rumor, statement in public journals, circulars, or other literature, or
common notoriety;provided, it appear to the court, upon, his declaration, under
oath.. . that he can and will, notwithstanding such an opinion, act impartially
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Id § 1076; see People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 2d 803, 815, 350 P.2d 103, 109-10, 3 Cal. Rptr. 351,
357-58 (1960). The Duncan court held that a juror will be considered competent to hear a
case if, notwithstanding the existence of extensive pretrial publicity or widespread public
rumor, the juror convinces the court that he or she will be able to act impartially and fairly.
19. Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Per-
emptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. Rnv. 1493, 1499 n.29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Minimum
Standards]. Because of the very general terms in which CAL. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West
1970) is stated, case law must be consulted to determine whether a particular state of mind
will be considered sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause for actual bias.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (West Supp. 1981) provides:
A. challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following
causes, and for no other.
1. Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to
be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was insti-
tuted, or to the defendant.
2. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, conservator and con-
servatee, attorney and client, master and.servant, or landlord and tenant, or being a
member of the family of the defendant, or of the person alleged to be injured by
[Voel. 15
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sively presumes bias or partiality." 21
The system of challenges for cause developed at common law
before the courts appreciated the important role that unconscious bias
can exert in skewing jury deliberations.' It is understandable, there-
fore, that challenges for cause based on either conscious or statutorily
defined biases have traditionally been considered the primary means
for eliminating prejudiced jurors from the venire. The importance
ascribed to these challenges is illustrated by the fact that, historically,
they have been kept within the court's control and have been poten-
tially unlimited in number.?3 However, the extent to which hidden
prejudices influence jury deliberations is becoming increasingly recog-
nized as a result of new insights acquired through the application of
social science techniques to test theories concerning the effects of indi-
vidual and group biases. Recognition of the vital function performed
by the peremptory challenge in securing an impartial jury requires a
reexamination of the importance assigned the function performed by
this challenge. 4
the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or in his
employment on wages.
3. Being a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having com-
plained against or been accused by him in a criminal prosecution.
4. Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment, or on a coro-
ner's jury which inquired into the death of a person whose death is the subject of
the indictment or information.
5. Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the offense
charged.
6. Having been one of a jury formerly sworn to try the same charge, and
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict, after the
case was submitted to it.
7. Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for
the act charged as an offense.
8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of such
conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty; in which
case he must neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror.
21. Photostat v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1964).
22. One commentator observed:
[At common law] no account [was] paid. . . to complexities, experiences and envi-
ronment as tending to cloud or clarify attitude of mind. Today, due largely to the
rise of scientific psychology, criminology and sociology, we readily concede that
these things do exert themselves powerfully upon the standards of fairness in all
men, no matter how conscientious they may be.
Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: Z The English Practice, 16 GEo. L. J. 438, 447
(1928) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
23. See Minimum Standards, supra note 19, at 1498-99.
24. Id But see Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 2, at 528-29 (authors found that in most
cases voir dire examination was singularly ineffective as a method of detecting potential
juror bias, and that most attorneys peremptorily excused as many jurors who were biased in
their favor as were biased against their cause).
1982]
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B The Peremptory Challenge
Traditionally, a peremptory challenge is considered an "arbitrary
and capricious right"25 afforded to the criminal defendant to challenge
a specified number of prospective jurors, without assignment of any
reason as to why the veniremen are unqualified to serve on the jury.26
This right has existed in felony prosecutions from the inception of the
common law.' For example, in all trials of capital felonies the defend-
ant was granted thirty-five peremptory challenges, and the prosecution
was permitted to challenge an unlimited number of veniremen without
assigning any cause."' While the right of peremptory challenge re-
mains the law in England today, the actual use of peremptory chal-
lenges in that country is extremely rare.29
In contrast, the practice of permitting peremptory challenges in
felony prosecutions in the United States has expanded and flourished
25. "For it is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be exer-
cised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose." Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,
378 (1892).
26. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), the United States Supreme Court
recognized that "[t]he essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
But see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
903 (1978), where the California Supreme Court, basing its decision on independent state
grounds, held that peremptory challenges could not be used in an arbitrary manner to re-
move prospective jurors solely on the ground of group bias. Group bias was found to exist
"when a party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of
an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. . . and
peremptorily strikes all such persons for that reason alone." Id at 276, 583 P.2d at 762, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 902. The court determined that this does not imply "that it is an objection for
which no reason need exist." Id at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (construing
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970)).
27. See Moore, supra note 20, at 444-45.
28. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965).
29. One commentator has noted that, in the selection of the English juries, the challenge
by counsel of a prospective juror is almost as rare as the challenge of a judge in the United
States. Moore, supra note 22, at 453 n.53. Moore suggests one reason for the divergence of
the American and English systems of jury selection might be found in the greater homoge-
neity of the English population. This is contrasted with the conditions existing in the United
States during the development of our jury system, where prospective jurors were drawn from
a cross-section of a more heterogeneous society. According to Moore, these differing social
conditions, together with the "fundamental confidence in the English juror's fairmindedness
vitalized by his oath," make the method of jury selection which is deemed appropriate and
practical in England to be totally unfeasible for this country. Id
Howard suggests that the difference results from the greater control exercised by Eng-
lish courts over pretrial publicity. "[O]ne of the salient reasons why both court and counsel
have confidence in the impartiality and integrity of trial jurors is the authority the courts
exercise in preventing the newspapers from prejudging a pending case." P. HOWARD, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 363 (1931) (citing Lawson & Keedy, Criminal Procedure in Eng-
land, I J. AM. INsT. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 595, 748 (1910).
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from its common law origin. Today, peremptories are "freely used and
relied upon."3 The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged
that voir dire examination in American trials has become "extensive
and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of perempto-
ries."'' Although the Constitution does not require that Congress or
the states grant litigants the privilege of peremptory challenges, 32 the
long history and widespread use of peremptory challenges confirm that
the "peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury.
'33
1. The role of the peremptory challenge
Blackstone viewed the peremptory challenge as a reflection of the
"tenderness and humanity for which our English laws are justly fa-
mous."3 4 He ascribed to it two essential functions: (1) it ensures that
the defendant will have a good opinion of the jury which tries him by
eliminating from the venire those jurors whom the defendant, without
any assignment of reason or cause, instinctively dislikes;35 and (2) it
eliminates from the venire those jurors who may have resented coun-
sels probing voir dire examination, or who were offended by any insin-
uation that they could not act with the requisite impartiality, but
against whom counsel has insufficient proof to sustain a challenge for
cause.
3 6
While the ostensible objective of voir dire is the selection of a fair
30. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218 (1965).
31. I1d at 219.
32. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the Con-
stitution of the United States which requires the Congress [or the states] to grant peremptory
challenges.. .... "). But see Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving '"ts Wonderful Power," 27 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 555-57 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Babcock]. Babcock presents an historical
analysis of the constitutional necessity for peremptory challenges. Babcock points out that,
in its original draft, the sixth amendment expressly provided for the right to challenge pro-
spective jurors. Id at 555 n.37.
33. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). The peremptory challenge is "'one of
the most important of the rights secured to the accused."' Id (quoting Pointer v. United
States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
34. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 [hereinafter cited as 4 W. BLACKSTONE].
35. Id. "In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that 'to perform its high function in
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice." ' " Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 219 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
36. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 353; Broeder, supra note 2, at 526-27. Broeder
found that jurors uniformly disliked lengthy voir dire examinations and expressed irritation
at those lawyers who conducted them. When the question "Can you be fair and impartial?"
was addressed to the prospective jury as a whole, prospective jurors apparently felt no re-
sentment. However, when questioned individually as to their ability to act impartially, ju-
rors often felt that their integrity was being questioned, and Broeder implies that in at least
one particular case this may have affected the verdict.
1982]
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and impartial jury, the litigants are striving to attain through voir dire
quite a different objective. In reality, each adversary is attempting to
use his or her quota of peremptory challenges to eliminate from the
venire those prospective jurors who are biased favorably toward the
opposing side, and to retain as many veniremen as possible who are
biased in the litigant's favor. Through the interaction of these opposing
forces, ideally, there should emerge an impartial jury composed of men
and women indifferent to either litigant's cause.37 Thus, the peremp-
tory challenge functions to "eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides,"38 and, at least in those situations where the venire is initially
representative of a cross section of the community, to secure as impar-
tial a jury as practicable under the circumstances.
39
2. History of the peremptory challenge in California
A party's right to use voir dire solely to form a basis for the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges has had a long and mercurial history in
the California courts. The California Supreme Court first addressed
this issue in 1863, in Watson v. Whitney,4° stating:
It is not necessary to determine whether affirmative answers
to these questions, or any one of them, would have formed a
proper ground for a challenge for cause. Each party has a
right to put questions to a juror, to show, not only that there
exists [sic] proper grounds for a challenge for cause, but to
37. See generally Babcock, supra note 32, at 549-52.
38. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
39. In People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), the
California Supreme Court held that, while no litigant is entitled to trial by a 'jury that
proportionately represents every group in the community. . . " id at 277, 583 P.2d at 762,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 903, the California Constitution secures to each litigant the right to be tried
by a 'jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as
the process of random draw permits." Id (construing CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16); see Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) ("[wlhen any large and identifiable segment of the community
is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human
nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps un-
knowable."); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (the process of jury selection must
"provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.").
Babcock has observed that:
The.ideal of an impartial jury as seen in the "cross section of the community"
cases is much more that people should be different from each other than individu-
ally "indifferent." But if the "cross section" ideal presupposes that absolute indif-
ference will not be achieved, then implicit in the goal of having a variety of people
on the jury is the idea that "impartial" jurors are ones who would at least be will-
ing to be persuaded and influenced by the life experiences of others.
Babcock, supra note 32, at 552.
40. 23 Cal. 375 (1863).
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elicit facts to enable the party to decide whether or not he will
make a peremptory challenge .... 41
Seventeen years later, in People v. Car Soy,42 the court, following
the Watson rule, again permitted voir dire examination to be used for
the purpose of establishing grounds for peremptory challenges. Deter-mining that the reasoning of Watson applied to the circumstances in
Car Soy, the court in that case upheld questioning which the trial court
had excluded.43
Only two years after Car Soy was decided, however, the supreme
court dramatically reversed its policy regarding the permissible extent
of voir dire. In People v. Hamilton, a prospective juror stated during
voir dire examination that he had formed a "qualified opinion ' 45 about
the case. Defense counsel then inquired, "'[flrom the opinion you
have formed in the case, and which you say is a qualified opinion, do
you believe the defendant to be guilty, or do you believe her to be inno-
cent?' "46 The trial court sustained an objection to the question.47
The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling. The
court determined that, while such a question might properly have been
asked to show actual bias, the defendant had not been challenged for
cause, and "[lt has never been declared, in any case where such declara-
tion was necessary to the decision, that a person summoned as a juror
may be questioned for the mere purpose of ascertaining whether. . . to
challenge him peremptorily."4 The court then expressly disapproved
the contrary language in Watson, labeling it "clearly dictum. "
49
41. Id. at 379. Watson involved an action for forcible entry and detainer. The defend-
ant in that case was a squatter on land owned by the plaintiff. The trial court denied defense
counsel permission to ask the prospective jurors: (1) whether they had been exposed to any
conversations concerning the rights of the parties involved in this case, and if so, whether
they had formed or expressed an opinion concerning those rights; (2) whether they had any
prejudices or biases against squatters; or (3) whether they had ever served as a juror on a
similar case. Id
42. 57 Cal. 102 (1880).
43. Id. at 103. In Car Soy, the defendant, who was Chinese, was on trial for robbery.
The questions that the court determined had been erroneously excluded were: "'1. Other
things being equal, would you take the word of a Chinaman as soon as you would that of a
white man?' . . .' '2. If the defendant, a Chinaman, should be sworn as a witness in his own
behalf, would you give his testimony the same credit that you would give to the story told by
a white person, under the same circumstances?"' Id
44. 62 Cal. 377 (1882).
45. Id. at 379.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 382-83 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 382. The Hamilton court found that both of the excluded questions in Car
Soy, if answered affirmatively, would have indicated the necessity of a challenge for cause.
1982]
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The new standard announced in Hamilton afforded counsel the
benefit of all information acquired from voir dire examination con-
ducted to determine the existence of actual or implied bias, but did not
permit counsel to "embark [on] a general exploration for the sole pur-
pose of satisfying himself whether it [would] be safe to be tried by a
juror against whom no legal objections [could] be urged."50 The court
reasoned that after exhausting voir dire examination for the purpose of
determining the existence of any actual or implied bias, counsel should
have sufficient information on which to exercise the right of peremp-
tory challenge.51
The rule announced in Hamilton was explicit and straightforward:
counsel could not, under any circumstances, use voir dire examination
solely for the purpose of establishing grounds for the exercise of per-
emptory challenges. As unequivocally as the Hamilton rule was stated,
it could reasonably have been assumed that the matter had been set-
tled. However, this was not the end, but merely the beginning, of the
court's struggle to define the parameters of litigants' rights during voir
dire.
In 1907, the supreme court inexplicably chose to ignore the rule of
Hamilton, and again revived the rule of Watson and Car Soy in People
v. Helm.52 In Helm, the defendant, who was on trial for murder, was
also the suspect in several other violent crimes which had occurred in
the community, and which had aroused great public sentiment and in-
dignation. One of the other crimes of which the defendant was sus-
pected was the murder of an individual named Jackson.53 During voir
dire examination, in a situation very similar to that in Hamilton, a pro-
spective juror conceded that he had formed an opinion concerning the
guilt or innocence of the defendant in connection with the Jackson
murder case. The trial court would not permit defense counsel to ask
the juror if, believing the defendant guilty of the Jackson murder, the
juror had not already formed an opinion concerning the defendant's
The court determined that the language concerning peremptory challenges in Watson was
dictum because one of the questions, asking whether or not the juror had formed or ex-
pressed an opinion regarding the case, might have elicited an answer that would have sus-
tained a challenge for cause. See supra notes 41 & 43.
50. 62 Cal. at 383; accord People v. Plyler, 126 Cal. 379, 381, 58 P. 904, 904 (1899);
-People v. Brittan, 118 Cal. 409, 412, 50 P. 664, 666 (1897); People v. Trask, 7 Cal. App. 103,
105, 93 P. 891, 892 (1907).
51. 62 Cal. at 382. "The law gives [counsel] the advantage of any knowledge which he
may.. . acquire [during voir dire], but does not afford him an opportunity to examine a
juror for the avowed object of determining whether he will challenge him peremptorily." Id
52. 152 Cal. 532, 93 P. 99 (1907).
53. Id. at 534, 93 P. at 100.
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guilt in the case at bar. 4 The supreme court held that the question
should have been permitted, not only because it would have been use-
ful to counsel in determining whether to challenge the juror for cause
for actual bias, but also because it was a "legitimate inquiry for the
purpose of determining whether a peremptory challenge should be
interposed.""5
This divergence of opinion finally forced the court, in 1912, to ac-
knowledge the existence of a conflict in the law concerning counsel's
right to use voir dire examination for any purpose other than to de-
velop a basis for exercising a challenge for cause. In People v. Ed-
wards,6 the court once again attempted to clarify the correct rule to be
applied, determining that the confusion which had arisen from these
conflicting opinions had resulted in:
an increasing tendency [on the part of trial courts] to prolong
; . . proceedings inordinately by allowing counsel on either
side to indulge in tedious examinations of jurors, apparently
with no definite purpose or object in view, but with the hope
of eliciting something indicating the advisability of a peremp-
tory challenge, and the. . . supposed privilege of doing this
has been greatly abused. 7
The Edwards court reasoned that no valid objective was served by
permitting counsel this purported privilege. Instead, the court held that
the areas of voir dire inquiry that were permissible to develop chal-
lenges for cause were so broad that counsel had more than sufficient
opportunity to gather information to test the feasibility of exercising
peremptory challenges.58
Edwards reaffirmed the Hamilton court's ruling that the questions
posed in Watson and Car Soy were permissible only because they had
the potential to elicit information that might lead to a challenge for
cause.59 Any remarks concerning the availability of voir dire to estab-
lish grounds for peremptory challenges were again held to be dictum.60
Helm was similarly dismissed. The court determined that the question
at issue there could properly have been asked to ascertain actual bias,
and the court's digression concerning peremptory challenges was un-
54. Id. at 546, 93 P. at 105.
55. Id.
56. 163 Cal. 752, 127 P. 58 (1912).
57. Id. at 753, 127 P. at 58 (emphasis added).
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necessary to the decision. 1
In reaffirming Hamilton, the Edwards court appeared to dispel any
lingering doubts concerning the permissible scope of voir dire examina-
tion. Many of the court's decisions following Edwards were equally as
adamant in rejecting the contention that voir dire could be used for any
function other than as a method to discover facts which would consti-
tute grounds for a challenge for cause.6 2 However, underlying dissen-
sion continued to emerge periodically, eroding the foundations of the
Edwards rule.6 3 This is well illustrated by two court of appeal deci-
sions which ignored Edwards entirely.
In Walker v. Greenberger,' the court of appeal held that the trial
court had erred in not permitting plaintiffs counsel, when questioning
prospective jurors concerning their qualifications, to ask the jurors' oc-
cupations. The court stated that "the question was a reasonable one to
aid plaintiff in determining whether to exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge." 65 This was not an isolated occurrence. Several years later, the
court of appeal in People v. Boorman6 6 held that the trial court had
erred by its refusal to permit defendant's counsel to ask prospective
jurors whether they were employed as deputy sheriffs. The record
showed that deputies of the sheriffs office had investigated the alleged
crime, and the complaint had been filed by a deputy sheriff. The court
omitted any reference to Edwards, and instead, expressly declared
Walker to state the "correct rule."
6 7
The question posed to the prospective jurors in Boorman could
arguably have been upheld as one tending to elicit information which
might constitute a challenge for cause; thus, any statement made by the
court concerning peremptory challenges could be labeled dictum. This
61. Id. at 756, 127 P. at 60.
62. See supra note 11.
63. The lower courts' perennial disregard for the Edwards rule prompted Judge Title, in
1961, to note:
[There is an] apparent diversity existing in California practice today between what
many attorneys and trial judges consider to be the law as compared to the actual
state of the law as enunciated in many of our appellate decisions. It appears quite
obvious that while the statutory law as well as a large body of case law exists in
California on the subject of what constitutes permissible voir dire examination, the
first impression of one examining the cases in some detail is that the practices fol-
lowed by counsel and trial judges in the trial court do not always coincide with the
pronouncement of the appellate courts.
Title, supra note 2, at 70.
64. 63 Cal. App. 2d 457, 147 P.2d 105 (1944).
65. Id. at 464, 147 P.2d at 109.
66. 142 Cal. App. 2d 85, 297 P.2d 741 (1956).
67. Id. at 90, 297 P.2d at 745.
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result would then be analogous to the Edwards court's determination,
where the language concerning peremptory challenges in Watson, Car
Soy, and Helm was labeled dicta.
However, the question of whether the Walker and Boorman courts
were technically correct in assuming that the excluded questions might
tend to elicit responses that would indicate the necessity of exercising a
peremptory challenge, rather than a challenge for cause, is unimpor-
tant. The significance of Walker and Boorman stems from their reflec-
tion of the unsettled state of the law and the divergence that existed
between the law as it was stated in Edwards and the law as it was actu-
ally being applied in the lower courts. With the appellate courts so
openly ignoring Edwards, what the trial courts were doing is
speculative.68
The supreme court was not unaware of the continuing conflict.6 9
Despite some lower courts' strict adherence to the Edwards rule,70 the
supreme court finally acknowledged that neither party "should suffer
an improper restriction upon a reasonable voir dire examination of pro-
spective jurors or a frustration of an intelligent exercise of peremptory
challenges."' I Against this background of conflicting opinions emerged
the Williams decision.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1978, the defendant, Jimmie Ray Williams, was arrested in con-
nection with the shooting death of his "drinking companion," Travis
King.72 The events leading up to the fatal shooting had begun earlier
68. As part of his participation in a panel discussion on the subject of jury selection,
Justice Stanley Mosk, then California Attorney General, made the following observation
about the Edwards rule:
I think the custom throughout California is not in accord with this strict rule. The
courts in two more recent cases have said that it is proper to question either for a
challenge for cause or as a basis for peremptory challenge. It is my belief that
throughout California the courts have followed the liberal rule of the Walker and
Boorman cases.
Selecting the Jury, supra note 12, at 873.
69. See People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 821 & n.2, 506 P.2d 193, 197 & n.2, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 373 & n.2 (1973).
70. See, e.g., People v. Soltero, 81 Cal. App. 3d 423, 428, 146 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978); Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878,
882, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1967); People v. Deriso, 222 Cal. App. 2d 478, 486-87, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 134, 139 (1963); People v. Canales, 12 Cal. App. 2d 215, 219, 55 P.2d 289, 291 (1936);
People v. Riordan, 79 Cal. App. 488, 495-96, 250 P. 190, 193 (1926); People v. Ecton, 29 Cal.
App. 478, 479, 156 P. 996, 996-97 (1916).
71. People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 147, 390 P.2d 381, 388, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 612, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964).
72. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 397, 628 P.2d 869, 870, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 318 (1981).
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in the evening when Williams and King, both apparently intoxicated,
were arrested following their participation in a fight on a freeway
ramp.73 The two were subsequently released from jail that same eve-
ning, and Williams went home. King, however, did not go home. In-
stead, he went to Williams' home to retrieve his car.74 Once there,
King spoke with Williams' son, informing him that he wished to speak
to Williams.75 King followed the son to the bedroom where Williams
had been sleeping with his one-year old grandson. When informed by
his son that King wished to see him, Williams responded that he was
"asleep" and did not want to talk to anyone.76 King pounded on the
door, shouted obscenities, and demanded that Williams come out of
the room and fight him." The door was opened and in the resulting
altercation between Williams and King, King was fatally shot.78
Williams was charged with murder. The principal issue at trial
was whether Williams had acted reasonably in defense of himself, his
grandson, and his home when he shot King.7 9 The jury acquitted Wil-
liams of murder but found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter.8"
The controversy in this case arose during voir dire examination.
The trial court initially questioned the veniremen as a group, asking
them if they could follow the court's instructions on the law to be ap-
plied in that case, regardless of any personal opinions or feelings they
might have about what the law was or should be.8 All the prospective
jurors affirmatively answered that they could follow the court's instruc-
tions.82 The trial court then inquired of the members of the panel
whether they could accept the propositions that the prosecutor must
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the
defendant is presumed to be innocent.8 3 None of the veniremen ex-
pressed any difficulty accepting those propositions.8 4
The court then permitted counsel, pursuant to section 1078 of the











83. Id. at 397-98, 628 P.2d at 870, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 318,
84. Id. at 398, 628 P.2d at 870, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
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ally.5 Defense counsel attempted to ask several questions which were
rejected by the court. One juror was asked whether, if instructed by the
court to apply a "reasonable person" standard of conduct, she could
hypothetically conceive of a "reasonable and prudent" person.8 6 The
court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the question. 7 The court
also sustained an objection to defense counsel's request that a prospec-
tive juror relate to him "a brief idea of your feeling about the right of a
person to defend himself in his own home."88
The court did allow defense counsel to question the prospective
jurors about whether they could follow the court's instructions on the
issue of self-defense even if they disagreed with the law. 9 The court
denied, however, counsel's request to ask the veniremen whether they
would willingly follow an instruction which required them to accept
the proposition that a person has a right to use necessary force to resist
an aggressor and that he or she has no duty to retreat.90
The sole issue on appeal was whether defense counsel had been
unnecessarily restricted in his attempt to ask the excluded questions,
either because the questions might have provided counsel with suffi-
cient information to justify a challenge for cause, "and were therefore
properly within the scope of the existing voir dire standard," 91 or be-
cause they might have facilitated the "intelligent exercise of peremp-
tory challenges and. . . therefore [should] have been allowed despite
California precedent to the contrary." 92
The California Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court and va-
cating the appellate court decisions, held that the standard which had
existed in California since the Edwards decision in 1912 was "unneces-
sarily restrictive."93 The court instead adopted the rule governing voir
dire existing in the majority of jurisdictions, 94 which permits counsel to
85. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part: "[The
trial court] shall permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the
people and for the defendant, such examination to be conducted orally and directly by coun-
sel." Section 1078 was amended in 1974 after the court's decision in People v. Crowe, 8 Cal.
3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973), which held that § 1078, as it then read,
permitted the trial court, at its discretion, to bar counsel from directly questioning prospec-
tive jurors during voir dire examination. Id at 824, 506 P.2d at 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
86. 29 Cal. 3d at 398, 628 P.2d at 870-71, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.







94. See, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); United
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"make reasonable inquiries to assist in the intelligent exercise of per-
emptory challenges."95 The court further held that prospective jurors
may be questioned about their willingness to apply a specific doctrine
of law if that doctrine is likely to be applied at trial, subject, of course,
to reasonable limitations and the discretion of the trial judge.96
IV. ANALYSIS
In Williams, the court criticized the Edwards rule97 on the ground
that it created an arbitrary standard which was "difficult to apply, er-
ratic in achievement of its desired end, and insensitive to the constitu-
tional mandate that the defendant be tried before a fair and impartial
jury.
' 98
The supreme court's goal in establishing the Edwards rule had
been to end the indiscriminate and time-consuming voir dire examina-
tion which it believed was becoming standard practice in the trial
courts. 99 The conflicting decisions which existed prior to Edwards con-
cerning the permissible scope of voir dire °° may have "led [some] trial
courts to give counsel great latitude [during voir dire], rather than risk
prejudicial error by confining the examination to reasonable limits.1'0
States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403,413 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578, 581
(3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,
368 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966,
971 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1965); Photo-
stat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1964); Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 12, 243
S.E.2d 59, 61 (1978); Johnson v. State, 399 N.E.2d 360, 363 (Ind. 1980); Gossett v. Common-
wealth, 426 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Ky. 1968); People v. Harrell, 398 Mich. 384, 388, 247 N.W.2d
829, 830 (1976); Oden v. State, 166 Neb. 729, 731, 90 N.W.2d 356, 358 (1958); State v. An-
derson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 71-72, 59 Ohio Op. 2d 85, 88-89, 282 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1972).
95. 29 Cal. 3d at 398, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
96. Id.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
98. Id. at 399, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319. The court recognized the potential
for conflict existing between its decision in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583
P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978), which ruled unconstitutional the use of
peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors from the venire on the basis of group
bias alone, see supra note 26, and the restrictions placed on voir dire by the Edwards rule.
Unless counsel are allowed to probe beneath the surface to uncover these actual, albeit hid-
den, biases, they will be forced in many instances to exercise their peremptory challenges on
the superficial basis found unconstitutional in Wheeler. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at
404-05, 628 P.2d at 875, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
99. 163 Cal. at 753, 127 P. at 58.
100. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
101. 163 Cal. at 753, 127 P. at 58. Title noted that even after Edwards expressly criticized
the trial courts for affording counsel too much latitude during voir dire rather than risk
prejudicial error, it was still advantageous for the trial courts to resolve any doubts they
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The court sought to curb this potential for abuse by restricting the
questioning of prospective jurors to only those areas that "tend to prove
some fact material to a challenge for cause.""0 2
In theory, the Edwards rule appeared to the court to be a reason-
able, workable standard, which would expedite voir dire, and which the
trial courts could execute more easily than the conflicting rules they
had been subject to in the past.103 The court, however, did not foresee
the practical problems which such a strict rule would engender, and
which would eventually be reflected not only in the refusal of many
lower courts to give effect to the rule," but also in the supreme court's
own occasionally ambivalent attitude toward Edwards.10 5
A. The Williams Court Rejects the Edwards Rule
The Williams court probed beneath the surface of Edwards to ex-
pose the fallacy of the rationale underlying the rule. The court rea-
soned that, even when strictly applied, the Edwards rule would permit
the trial court to sustain any question asked during voir dire that could
conceivably lead to a response that would reveal a "legally cognizable
bias."'1 6 Thus, in practice, the only constraint on voir dire afforded by
this precept was that which the trial court in its discretion might
impose.
107
Trial courts, confronted with such a vague and "unwieldy stan-
dard,"' 8 had been encouraged out of necessity to develop their own
guidelines to implement the Edwards rule.'0 9 This broad discretion re-
posed in the trial courts had resulted in the adoption by some courts of
might have about the validity of a question under the Edwards rule in favor of allowing the
question. This strategy was recommended in light of the continuing tendency on the part of
the appellate courts to affirm those decisions which violated the Edwards rule on the ration-
ale that the disputed question might possibly have led to a challenge for cause. Conversely,
especially in close cases, the exclusion of a question because of strict adherence to Edwards
was more likely to be ruled error, accordingly, any doubt that the appellate court might
entertain was usually resolved in favor of permitting the question. Title, supra note 2, at 78-
79.
102. 163 Cal. at 755, 127 P. at 59.
103. Id. at 756, 127 P. at 59.
104. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
106. 29 Cal. 3d at 399, 628 P.2d at 872, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
107. Id. The Williams court further reasoned that "Edwards imposed no limit on the
form of the questioning; as long as the questions were material to a challenge for cause, they
could be as endlessly repetitive or confusing as counsel cared to make them, subject only to
the limits of the court's patience." Id
108. Id. at 400, 628 P.2d at 372, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
109. Id.
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what was essentially an "ad hoe balancing test,"" 0 which permitted
counsel to ask a particular question during voir dire if the probability
that the question would lead to a challenge for cause outweighed the
probability that the question would form the basis for a peremptory
challenge."' Those courts that preferred to interpret the Edwards rule
narrowly could exclude any question where the probability that it
would lead to a peremptory challenge was the more predictable re-
sult." 2 This was done, although, as was pointed out by the Williams
court, strict adherence to Edwards would allow any question to be
asked during voir dire if there was a possibility, however remote, that it
could form a basis for a challenge for cause, regardless of whether the
more probable result would be to elicit facts that would indicate the
advisability of exercising a peremptory challenge."
3
In contrast, some trial courts, preferring to exercise the broad dis-
cretion afforded them under the Edwards rule, would permit any ques-
tion to be asked during voir dire that could conceivably lead to a
challenge for cause." 4 This diversity of practice in the lower courts led
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. In People v. Canales, 12 Cal. App. 2d 215, 55 P.2d 289 (1936), the defendant, a
gold miner, was charged with possession of a deadly weapon during the course of a miner's
strike in the community. The court refused to allow defense counsel to question prospective
jurors about any prejudices they might harbor regarding the strike, finding such inquiry to
be an "exploration for the purpose of arriving at a decision as to whether a peremptory
challenge should be exercised." Id at 219, 55 P.2d at 291.
While the court was undoubtedly correct in assuming that such a question had the
potential to elicit facts that would indicate to counsel whether to exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge, an examination into the prospective juror's attitudes concerning the strike, which con-
tinued during the trial, unquestionably had the potential to uncover any actual bias toward
the defendant which might have existed among the members of the venire. Such question-
ing could have been sustained under the rationale of Edwards, see infra note 114 and accom-
panying text, as possibly leading to a challenge for cause, even though this was not the more
probable result of this examination. The court in Canales, however, preferred to construe
the Edwards rationale narrowly and restricted questioning to only those areas that would
most likely result in a challenge for cause. 12 Cal. App. 2d at 219, 55 P.2d at 291.
A very restrictive interpretation of Edwards was also followed in People v. Estorga, 206
Cal. 81, 83, 273 P. 575, 576 (1928), where the trial court refused to permit defense counsel, in
a rape prosecution, to ask prospective jurors whether they were married, had children, or
whether any member of their family had ever been a victim of rape. The supreme court
upheld such a restriction on the ground that it "was not so much for the purpose of laying
the basis of challenges for cause as to pave the way for possible peremptory challenges
... ."d at 87, 273 P. at 577. Estorga illustrates, again, the philosophy pervading many
trial court decisions that Edwards could be interpreted to limit voir dire examination to only
those areas that presented the greatest potential for establishing bases for challenges for
cause.
113. 29 Cal. 3d at 399, 628 P.2d at 871-72, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
114. See supra note 101.
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to the arbitrary and erratic results criticized in Williams, 15 where ulti-
mately, "the substance of the questions which. . . [were] permitted by
the trial court. . . depend[ed] upon the particular philosophy of the
trial judge, as well as all of the facts and circumstances of the case
before the court."
' 16
. The Intended Goal of Williams
The Williams court was highly critical of the attitude it found per-
vading many lower court opinions that the process of securing an im-
partial jury required only that the venire be purged of those potential
jurors who harbored conscious bias.'1 7 The belief that actual bias was
synonymous with consciously held bias was one of the most dangerous
and unwarranted assumptions engendered by the Edwards rule and
was one which was eagerly perpetuated by those courts that preferred
to facilitate voir dire by restricting its scope to the narrowest limits le-
gally permissible.' 18
Unconsciously held bias is by definition difficult to detect. "More-
over, little psychological insight is needed to realize that the setting in
which voir dire is conducted creates additional pressures for the venire-
man to answer questions as he believes the judge would have him an-
swer, or in conformity with the answers of the preceding panelists."' 19
115. 29 Cal. 3d at 399, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
116. Title, supra note 2, at 74.
117. 29 Cal. 3d at 401, 628 P.2d at 873, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
118. Id. The court declared that one of the most unfortunate consequences of the restric-
tion on voir dire mandated by Edwards was counsel's increasing tendency to engage in ex-
pensive pretrial screenings and surveys to establish some basis for the use of peremptory
challenges. Id at 405, 628 P.2d at 875, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 323. The court objected to such
pretrial techniques not only because they tended to exacerbate the problems confronted by
the trial courts in Wheeler, but also because they tended to create the impression that the
ability to exercise peremptory challenges is effectively dependent upon the relative affluence
of the litigants. See supra note 26 for a discussion of Wheeler. See generally Note, The
Constitutional Needfor Discovery ofPre-voir Dire Juror Studies, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 600-
01 nn.19-28 (1976) (citing various examples of social science studies and references that
attorneys may consult to confirm intuitive impressions they might entertain regarding a pro-
spective juror's potential to render a favorable verdict, based on such characteristics as the
juror's race, sex, education, religion, income, and other social or economic traits).
119. 29 Cal. 3d at 403, 628 P.2d at 874, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322; see Broeder, supra note 2, at
510-15. As a result of his studies of federal district court procedures, Broeder concluded that
jurors often give misleading answers and at times intentionally deceive counsel during voir
dire. In the course of his experiment, Broeder frequently found that prospective jurors sim-
ply remained silent when asked about any possible connection they might have with the
litigants or counsel involved in the case.
One case, in particular, illustrates the type of deception encountered by counsel during
a voir dire examination. While voir dire was being conducted in a larceny prosecution, one
prospective juror, Mrs. Edwards, was questioned about any possible association she might
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The court emphasized the necessity for permitting more expansive
voir dire to discover these "subtle manifestations of bias." 120 The court
believed that preventing counsel from inquiring into those areas that
have the potential to uncover actual, albeit hidden, prejudices would be
a denial of the finite effectiveness of questions aimed solely at uncover-
ing only the more obvious, legally recognized biases.12 ' While jurors
are presumed to respond in good faith during voir dire, 122 and their
assurances that they will be able to act with the requisite impartiality
will ordinarily insulate them from a challenge for cause, 123 the court
believed that this should not preclude further, reasonable questioning
that might uncover bias of which the juror is either "unaware or which,
because of his impaired objectivity, he unreasonably believes he can
overcome."
124
C The Potential Effect of Williams on Voir Dire Examination in
California
The court acknowledged that the rule announced in Williams will
leave intact the broad discretion afforded trial courts to conduct voir
dire."z The court warned, however, that caution should be exercised by
both counsel and the courts so that the "extensive and unfocused ques-
tioning"'126 which precipitated the adoption of the Edwards rule should
not again become the standard. Close scrutiny of the Williams ration-
have had with the defense counsel. In fact, Mrs. Edwards was well acquainted with defense
counsel as a result of their mutual participation in political campaigns and her having been
entertained as a guest in his home. During questioning, however, Mrs. Edwards mislead-
ingly admitted to only a casual friendship with defense counsel and asserted that such a
relationship would not influence her decision. Mrs. Edwards subsequently ignored her ear-
lier assurances that this "casual" relationship would not affect her decision, and during de-
liberation, one of her chief arguments for acquittal 'was based on the assumption that
because defense counsel was an honest man, he would not be representing the defendant
unless the defendant were innocent. Id. at 511. This is but one of numerous examples cited
by Broeder which support his contention that voir dire is generally ineffective as a mecha-
nism for screening out biased jurors. Id at 521. The California Supreme Court has also
acknowledged the unyillingness of biased jurors to confess openly their prejudices during
voir dire examination and the failure of questions that require only a right or wrong answer
to elicit pertinent information necessary to detect such biases. See People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d
815, 831 n.31, 506 P.2d 193, 204 n.31, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380 n.31 (1973).
120. 29 Cal. 3d at 403, 628 P.2d at 874, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
121. Id.
122. See People v. Preston, 9 Cal. 3d 308, 313, 508 P.2d 300, 303, 107 Cal. Rptr. 300, 303
(1973). But see supra text accompanying note 119.
123. See sufpra note 18 and accompanying text.
124. 29 Cal. 3d at 402, 628 P.2d at 873, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
125. Id. at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
126. Id.
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ale compels the conclusion that the court intends reasonableness to be
the criterion for evaluating the propriety of voir dire examination.
1 27
The central issue posed in Williams, which was never adequately
answered by the court, was: Within the parameters of this reasonable-
ness standard, how extensive must examination of prospective jurors be
to ensure an intelligent basis for exercising peremptory challenges?
The majority conceded that it will be impossible to determine "a priori
the proper balance to be struck by the trial courts in each case."
128
However, the court recommended the guidelines set forth by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Robinson. 29 These guide-
lines provide that counsel should be allowed to investigate "'matters
concerning which either the local community or the population at large
is commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short of
presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations in
fact.' "130 Additionally, the Williams court held that "if a particular
juror has given the court some reason to suspect he harbors such feel-
ings, even though the general population does not, further questioning
would be appropriate.""' 3
1. Application of the new rule
The standard that the court adopted in Williams offers little practi-
cal guidance for trial courts to rely upon when they must decide
whether a proposed question might conceivably lead to the exercise of
a peremptory challenge. The court found that all the questions that
had been excluded during voir dire in Williams were arguably permis-
sible under the Robinson test, 32 although only the question relating to
the prospective jurors' feelings about the retreat rule was considered to
have been erroneously and prejudicially excluded.133 The supreme
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
130. 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
131. 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
132. Id at 410-11, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
133. The court found the retreat rule sufficiently controversial to warrant inquiry into
possible reservations the jurors might have about applying it at trial. Its controversial nature
was evidenced by the divergence of opinion existing in other jurisdictions regarding an indi-
vidual's duty to exhaust all reasonable avenues of retreat before using force in self-defense.
The court held that prospective jurors may be questioned about their willingness to apply
specific doctrines of law when it appears from the nature of the case that such a doctrine will
become relevant during the course of the trial. Id
The court emphasized, however, that this decision should not be interpreted by counsel
as sanctioning examination of prospective jurors concerning their knowledge of the law, but
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court recognized that, under the considerable discretion which trial
courts will be afforded when following the Robinson rule, one court
could reasonably have permitted all the questions that were excluded
during voir dire in Williams, while a more restrictive court might have
excluded all of the questions except the one relating to the retreat rule
and still have remained within the constraints of Robinson.134  The
court's criticism of the Edwards rule, that it leads to different standards
depending upon the particular philosophy of the trial court,1 35 appears
to apply with equal force to the Williams rule.
In her concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird criticized the lack of
guidelines offered trial courts under the Williams rule and the unpre-
dictable results which necessarily will flow from its application.13 6 The
chief justice cited the majority's application of the Robinson guidelines
to determine which of the proposed questions in Williams had been
erroneously excluded as a perfect illustration of the problem underly-
ing the rule. 37 As adopted by the majority, the Robinson rule would
allow trial courts to exclude a question that attempted to explore a
venireman's feelings concerning a person's right to use self-defense in
the home because such a "generally accepted tenet" 138 is unlikely to
evoke any controversy. However, the question of a person's right to
use force in self-defense despite the existence of a possibility for retreat
was determined by the majority to be sufficiently controversial to war-
rant inquiry into jurors' attitudes and possible reservations about ap-
plying such a doctrine. 39 Chief Justice Bird stated:
only as permisision to ascertain juror attitudes toward relevant legal doctrines and their
willingness to apply these doctrines at trial. Id. at 410, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
The court held that such examination was necessary in light of the ineffectiveness of general,
broad based questions to uncover possible unconscious or subtle hesitation to apply specific,
controversial rules of law:
[I]t is untenable to conclude that the veniremen's general declaration of willingness
to obey the judge is tantamount to an oath that he would not hesitate to apply any
conceivable instruction, no matter how repugnant to him. Hence the answer is
merely a predictable promise that cannot be expected to reveal some substantial
overtly held bias against particular doctrines.
Id. (footnote omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 399-400, 628 P.2d at 872, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
136. Id. at 412-13, 628 P.2d at 880, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Chief
Justice Bird predicted that the new rule would prove in practice to be as difficult to apply
systematically and consistently as the earlier Edwards rule and would perpetuate the diverse
voir dire procedures already employed by trial courts according to individual custom. Id. at
413, 628 P.2d at 880, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
137. Id.




The distinction drawn between these two lines of ques-
tioning is ephemeral at best. The right to use deadly force
against an intruder, even in the home, is certainly controver-
sial in our society. Some people would probably find it even
more controversial than the no-retreat rule. The majority's
ability to draw a neat line between these two questions is
more a comment on the justices' personal views of the two
issues than a reflection of an objective difference in commu-
nity attitudes.
140
Such a standard will always tend to produce erratic results because trial
courts will always differ in their evaluations of what issues will have
sufficient controversial or emotional impact in the community to justify
counsel's investigation during voir dire.
141
2. Potential problems arising under the Williams rule
The Williams court encouraged trial courts to seek guidance from
Robinson to effectuate this new ruling. 142  In adopting the Robinson
standard, however, the court inexplicably failed to apply the entire test
as it was set forth by the Robinson court.
Robinson, like Williams, involved a trial court's refusal to permit
defense counsel to question prospective jurors during voir dire on the
140. Id. at 413, 628 P.2d at 880, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328. In criticizing the Robinson stan-
dard as inherently unworkable because of the broad discretion afforded trial judges to ascer-
tain community attitudes and prejudices, Chief Justice Bird suggested instead that trial
courts adopt guidelines similar to those found in Evidence Code § 352. Section 352 pro-
vides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury." Id at 414 n.2, 628 P.2d at 881 n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 329
n.2 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966)). Such a standard, the Chief Justice sug-
gested, will permit trial courts to conduct voir dire more effectively because it win entail no
more than "weighing the relevance of questions against their potential to create confusion or
waste time," id at 414, 628 P.2d at 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 329, and the courts are already
experienced and qualified to make such judgments. Id
141. Id. at 413, 628 P.2d at 880-81, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29. Trial courts have tradition-
ally been afforded considerable discretion in determining the qualifications of veniremen to
serve on the jury, and the Williams court acknowledged that its decision will leave this broad
discretion intact. Id. at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325. A trial court's finding
that a prospective juror is acceptable will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that as
a matter of law the juror was biased or prejudiced. People v. Carter, 56 Cal. 2d 549, 574,364
P.2d 477,492, 15 Cal. Rptr. 645, 660 (1961); People v. Riordan, 79 Cal. App. 488,496,250 P.
190, 194 (1926). See generally Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury,
60 COLUM. L. Rnv. 349, 355 n.32 (1960) ("As a practical matter, a defendant seeking appel-
late relief must show that the trial was in fact unfair, not merely that the trial judge abused
his discretion. .. ."); Minimum Standards, supra note 17, at 1509-10.
142. Id. at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
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issue of self-defense. Specifically, counsel attempted to ask whether
any members of the v6nire felt that self-defense does not justify the
willful taking of human life,'43 and whether any felt that he or she
would be unable to follow the court's instructions on self-defense be-
cause of his or her personal views on the subject."' The Robinson
court held that when there is a reasonable basis for believing that bias
exists:
and there is consequent need for a searching voir dire exami-
nation, in situations where, for example, the case carries racial
overtones, or involves other matters concerning which either
the local community or the population at large is commonly
known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short of pre-
sumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations in
fact.t1451 . . . [T]he trial court must take it into account and
govern the voir dire accordingly. Still other forms of bias and
distorting influence have become evident, through experience
with juries, and have come to be recognized as a proper sub-
ject for the voir dire. 146
This was the formulation of the test as adopted by the Williams
court. This was not, however, the complete statement of the rule as
articulated in Robinson. In addition to the language quoted above, the
Robinson court went on to hold:
When the matter sought to be explored on voir dire does
not relate to one of those recognized classes, it is incumbent
upon the proponent to lay a foundation for his question by
showing that it is reasonably calculated to discover an actual
and likely source of prejudice, rather than pursue a specula-
tive will-o-the-wisp.1
47
Robinson thus required that, in the absence of a determination by the
trial court that the issue sought to be explored on voir dire was one that
was commonly known to arouse strong feelings in the community or in
the population at large, or that because of long experience with juries
143. 475 F.2d at 380 n.7.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 381 (footnotes omitted). The court cited the following examples as illustrative
of matters so commonly known to engender prejudice as to require no special showing by
counsel: wagering, the use of intoxicants, a witness who intends to testify that he lied to
another, and religious minorities. Id at n.9.
146. Id. at 381 (footnotes omitted). As an example of a distorting influence which has
been recognized empirically as a proper area for voir dire examination, the court cited the




was empirically recognized as having the potential for exposing biases
or distorting influences, counsel must lay some foundation for the pro-
posed question to ensure that the court could reasonably conclude that
an actual potential for prejudice existed.
In applying this test, the Robinson court found that the issue of
self-defense did not fall into one of those recognized categories that are
commonly known to have the potential for influencing or substantially
skewing jury deliberations. 4 ' Because the defendants failed to show,
either at the time the proposed questions were submitted to the trial
judge or later before the appellate court, facts in support of their con-
tention that a claim of self-defense was likely to encounter bias in the
community from which the veniremen were to be drawn, the court re-
fused to reverse their convictions. The court reasoned that, in the ab-
sence of such a showing, there had been no prejudice to the rights of
the accused.'
49
In contrast to the Robinson court's requirement that counsel pres-
ent some basis for believing that a proposed question had the potential
to elicit an actual and likely source of bias, 150 the Williams court, in
adopting Robinson, emphasized the trial court's discretion to determine
not only whether the proposed voir dire tended to probe some area
known to evoke strong sentiments within the community or the popula-
tion at large, but also whether a particular prospective juror might har-
bor such prejudice, even though generally others would not.15' The
Williams court inexplicably excluded any requirement that counsel lay
some foundation for a proposed area of questioning when the subject
148. Id. at n.10.
149. Id. at 381. In United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1007 (1973), the court of appeals, in applying the Robinson test, determined that the
trial court had not erred when it refused to permit defense counsel to ask prospective jurors
whether they:
believed that an inference of guilt should be drawn from the fact that Peterson had
been indicted; whether any felt that in the instance of a fatality, "someone ha[s] to
pay for" the taking of life; and whether any [of them] had an innate fear of fire-
arms that might cause him to view with apprehension a person who possessed or
used one.
Id. at 1226. The court held that none of the questions related to areas which were empiri-
cally known to arouse strong feelings in the community, and because the defendant had
made no effort to lay a foundation for these questions by showing that they had the potential
to uncover actual bias, the court perceived no prejudice to the rights of the accused. Id at
1228; see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 533 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("where the claimed prejudice is of a novel character, the judge might
require a preliminary showing of relevance or of possible prejudice before allowing the
questions.").
150. 475 F.2d at 381.
151. 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
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matter involved did not fall within a class judicially recognized as a
source of potential bias.
The variance with which these guidelines can be applied is well
illustrated by the divergent approaches taken by the Williams and
Robinson courts in adapting this same rule to remarkably similar cases.
In Robinson, the court held that the self-defense question 152 could not
be explored on voir dire in the absence of some presentation by counsel
that would support the inference that the proposed questions had the
potential for exposing actual bias. Instead, the court went so far as to
observe that "the pioneering social research into the ethos and behavior
of jurors shows that, in many situations, the typical jury take [sic] a
rather charitable view toward a plea of self-defense, tending to inter-
pret the evidence adduced in a manner distinctly favorable to the
accused." 1-53
In contrast, the Williams court held that, while a question which
generally encompasses the issue of self-defense was not likely to un-
cover strong sentiment, 54 a question relating specifically to the no-re-
treat rule would present a real possibility of detecting bias because of
the "controversial"' 155 nature of the doctrine. This waspurel an arbi-
trary judicial determination; the court imposed no burden on counsel
to show that such a doctrine was likely to encounter strong resistance in
the community or general population.
5 6
While the proposed questions in Williams and Robinson were not
identical, the issues involved in both cases were sufficiently analogous
to illustrate the contrasting approaches which can be taken by different
courts in implementing the same rule. This can only foreshadow what
will occur when trial courts attempt to give content to this new
standard.
Those courts that prefer to give a more restrictive reading to the
latitude afforded counsel during voir dire could interpret the apparent
intent of Williams narrowly, permitting inquiry into only those areas
that the court determines are commonly known to arouse strong feel-
152. 475 F.2d at 380 n.7. Specifically, defense counsel wished to ask whether any member
of the venire felt that self-defense did not justify the taking of a human life, and whether
they would be able to follow the court's instructions on self-defense despite their personal
views on the subject. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
153. Id. at 381 n.10.
154. 29 Cal. 3d at 411, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
155. Id.
156. The Robinson court also had its own predilections about what subjects would prove
so controversial as to require no independent showing of potential to arouse strong public
sentiment. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
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ings within the community or general population.157 Other courts, con-
struing Williams more broadly, might follow the supreme court's
recommendation to seek guidance from the Robinson decision 58 and
adopt that test in its entirety to implement the Williams rule. The em-
phasis in Robinson on reliance on such outside sources as sociological
research studies, 159 to be used by counsel as a foundation for proposed
voir dire examination, seems to invite more extensive and, perhaps,
time consuming 60 voir dire than would be found in those courts that
construe Williams more narrowly.
V. CONCLUSION
The pereinptory challenge plays a vital role in safeguarding a
party's constitutional right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. The
peremptory challenge can serve this purpose, however, only when
counsel is afforded sufficient latitude during voir dire to elicit the infor-
mation necessary to ensure that it will be exercised intelligently. In
People v. Williams,6 ' the California Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized the essential role played by the peremptory challenge in securing
a criminal defendant this constitutional right and the necessity of inte-
grating it with a sufficiently probing voir dire of prospective jurors to
assure that its potential is effectively realized.
In adopting this new rule, which permits counsel to use voir dire
for the express purpose of establishing grounds for the exercise of per-
emptory challenges, the court has been forced to acknowledge the fail-
ure of long-standing precedent to secure a workable, pragmatic
standard which trial courts could administer uniformly. Williams,
however, will not necessarily effect a radical change in the way voir
dire examination is conducted in most trial courts. The potential effect
157. 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
160. There are inherent limitations to the scope of voir dire examination. The Williams
court believed that the potential for abuse is slim because attorneys want to avoid offending
or alienating the jury by prolonging voir dire inordinately. Id at 409 n.13, 628 P.2d at 878
n.13, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.13; seesupra note 36; Broeder, supra note 2, at 515. In his study,
Broeder found that a "psychological time limit" existed for voir dire examination that was
instinctively observed by attorneys; excess voir dire was regarded as having the potential not
only to alienate the jury, but also to irritate the judge.
Voir dire is frequently ineffective simply because counsel cannot readily perceive what
biases the veniremen might actually harbor which would justify further inquiry. Con-
versely, some prejudices may be so apparent to the attorney that a searching voir dire will
not even be necessary to justify the exercise of peremptory challenge. Minimum Standards,
supra note 19, at 1522 n.119.
161. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981).
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of Williams is perhaps best summarized by Justice Richardson in his
dissenting opinion, when he stated:
I have no quarrel with the efforts of my colleagues of the
majority as they seek to articulate a broad rule which would
permit counsel "to ask questions reasonably designed to assist
in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges". . . and
to preserve considerable discretion of "the trial court to con-
tain voir dire within reasonable limits." Similarly, I agree
with my colleague of the concurrence who points to the lack
of specificity of the proposed new standard and the broad
generality of the analysis and test advanced in extended fash-
ion by the majority. I take no issue with my colleague's ef-
forts in this direction because it is my belief and observation
that this is exactly what trial courts in the area of voir dire
examination have been doing for years. 162
While the standard for conducting voir dire remains that of rea-
sonableness, it is a standard that permits a multitude of interpretations.
The California courts have demonstrated that they are not averse to
developing their own guidelines when the California Supreme Court's
rules are found to be impracticable. The broad strokes with which the
Williams rule was drawn will only perpetuate the divergent voir dire
practices which currently exist in California courts.
Debra K. Buleyn
162. 29 Cal. 3d at 414-15, 628 P.2d at 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing on other grounds) (citations omitted).
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